Pleasure, Pain, and the Formation of Virtue in Aristotle's Ethics

Introduction

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that the ethical life is directly intertwined with the feelings of pleasure and pain. Aristotle writes that "we regulate our actions by pleasure and pain," and so "our whole inquiry, then, must be concerned with them" (1105a 4-5). Rather than being solely an outcome of moral behavior, these feelings are central to the formation of virtue. One's exposure to pleasure and pain develops their character, forms habits, and ultimately enables them to achieve eudaimonia. Aristotle presents a bold view, in which moral character is not just a matter of rational choice, but also of desiderative alignment. He explains that "virtue of character is concerned with pleasures and pains: it is because of pleasure that we do bad actions, and pain that we abstain from noble ones" (1104b9-11). Through this essay, I will demonstrate how pleasure and pain are crucial conditions for the development of virtue and ultimately a life of eudaimonia. I will conclude this essay by exploring how Aristotle's account of these feelings can be applied to contemporary ethical challenges and assess its limitations.

Habituation and the Moral Significance of Pleasure and Pain (Book II)

In Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle establishes the principle that ethical virtue is acquired by habituation, and that the feelings of pleasure and pain are fundamental components of this process. He explains that the "virtue of character is a result of habituation" and that "nature gives us the capacity to acquire them, and completion comes through habituation" (1103a15-26). To Aristotle, it is clear that moral character is not something one is born with, and instead is developed through repeated exposure to actions that align with reason. The primary objective of this training is not to simply do the right thing, but also to feel pleasure about doing the right thing. Aristotle explains that "we must take as an indication of a person's states the pleasure or pain supervening on what he does" (1104b1-6). Aristotle firmly believes that the way someone feels about their action reveals the state of their character.

Aristotle reinforces this sentiment by explaining that the "virtue of character is concerned with pleasures and pains: it is because of pleasure that we do bad actions, and pain that we abstain from noble ones" (1104b9-11). A virtuous person is not one who performs good actions, but one who finds pleasure in good actions and pain in bad ones. This alignment of feeling pleasure from doing good is a core component of what makes someone truly virtuous. Through both education and habituation, one must "find enjoyment or pain in the right things," as without it, they lack the emotional foundation of moral virtue (1104b13-15).

Pleasure and pain also have a powerful influence on the method in which one judges right from wrong. "Whether we feel enjoyment and pain in a good or bad way has great influence on our actions," he writes, adding that "our whole inquiry, then, must be concerned with them" (1105a4-6). These feelings shape more than just our actions, enabling us to properly evaluate moral choices. Taking pleasure in what is good and feeling pain in what is wrong is essential for moral judgment. Without this emotional alignment, one's ethical reasoning will not be consistent.

Overall, in Book II, Aristotle establishes that pleasure and pain are essential to a virtuous life as they shape our character and moral responses. This ethical framework demonstrates the importance of training one's desires to align with reason, so that one incurs pleasure in good actions and feels pain in bad actions.

The Divided Soul (Book VII)

As Book II explores the importance of habituating one's responses of pleasure and pain to align with virtue, Book VII demonstrates what occurs when this training fails. Contrary to Socrates, Aristotle believes akrasia (weakness of will) exists and occurs when one acts against their better judgement, a result of their temptation from pleasure or fear of pain. To best illustrate this, Aristotle distinguishes four character types: the virtuous, the incontinent, the continent, and the vicious.

Aristotle describes a virtuous person as someone whose desires are properly aligned with reason. Someone who is incontinent has a weakness of will as they know what is right but fail to act in accordance with this knowledge, affirming the idea that knowledge of the good is not enough for moral action (1145b10-15). The continent person experiences the same temptations but ultimately resists them, knowing they are bad (1145b10-15). Although they ultimately do good, their desires are conflicted as they have yet to be shaped by habituation. Finally, the vicious person is one whose reason is corrupted, acting wrongly without feeling remorse for their actions. Aristotle's distinction of the four different character types reflects the importance of training and regulating desires. He clarifies that while the continent and incontinent characters may struggle with their desires, they are capable of becoming virtuous through training as their reasoning is correct. However the reasoning of a vicious person is corrupted, making the path to virtue far more difficult (1150a9-1152a7).

Aristotle focuses on the temptations of bodily desires in particular, explaining they are the most difficult to resist. He explains that bodily pleasures are central to human experience and are difficult to moderate, as they are the primary areas in which excess occurs (1148a5-15). Because of the abundance and potency of these pleasures, Aristotle argues that one who has not trained the desiderative part of their soul to properly respond to these impulses will fall into incontinence.

By thoroughly explaining these character types, Aristotle demonstrates that the calculative part of the soul – guided by practical wisdom (phronēsis) – should govern over the desiderative part of the soul. He demonstrates that moral failure occurs not only when one is ignorant (vicious), but also when one's desires overpower their judgment. In this way, Book VII complements Book II by illustrating the consequences of a soul lacking internal harmony between the desiderative and calculative parts of the soul. Without the ability to feel pleasure in the good and pain from the bad, Aristotle argues that the soul becomes divided and ultimately unable to achieve eudaimonia.

Pleasure as Completion (Book X)

In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle fully explains his account of pleasure, arguing that it is not something that opposes virtue but instead completes it. Although other philosophers of his time view pleasure as irrational, Aristotle believes that the right kind of pleasure is essential to eudaimonia. He writes that "pleasure completes the activity not as the inherent state does, but as a sort of supervenient end, like the bloom on the faces of young men" (1174b32-34). In this metaphor, pleasure is not the goal of an action, but the natural byproduct that arises when one performs a good action well. However, it is important to clarify that although all activities are accompanied by pleasure, not all pleasures are equal. Some pleasures are deceptive and arise from disordered desires, while others are grounded in noble activity. Aristotle writes that the virtuous person ultimately takes pleasure in what is truly good, confirming that their soul is in harmony.

Aristotle further explains that "each activity has its own proper pleasure… and the pleasures enhance the activities" (1175a34-35). The highest form of proper pleasure occurs when a person who lives in accordance with reason engages in reason guided activities such as contemplation. Aristotle believes that contemplation is a human's highest good, reflecting the proper function of a rational being (1177a18-25). He further describes the act of contemplation as "superior in its seriousness, to aim at no end beyond itself," ultimately concluding that a life lived like this represents the most complete form of eudaimonia (1177b18-25).

Aristotle's account of pleasure in Book X reinforces his arguments in Books II and VII. Feeling the right pleasures and pains is not a secondary part of moral life – it is a core indicator that one's character is properly trained. By taking pleasure in doing good actions, our desires, reasoning, and habits are all properly aligned – thus, signaling that virtue is fully developed.

Modern Relevance of Aristotle's Ethics

Aristotle's account of pleasure, habituation, and its relation to virtue, provides a profound lens to examine the contemporary lifestyles many lead. The mindset of deriving pleasure from what is truly good, and feeling pain in what is not, is not prevalent in modern society. Currently, modern society is dominated by instant gratification, overstimulation, and the avoidance of nearly everything not deemed pleasurable. Although our present day is shaped by innumerable factors not present during Aristotle's life, the ethical concerns of building character, responding to desire, and forming our habits, all remain extremely valuable.

For instance, social media is an invention of recent but has entirely transformed how most people live. Platforms like TikTok, X, Instagram, and Youtube all provide quick "dopamine hits," which are effortless scrolls catered towards one's desires in the form of a "for you page." This extraordinarily accessible pleasure machine may seem to have no consequences, but as with everything, if it is too good to be true, it likely is. These pleasures are accessible to anyone with a device and internet connection, and are not exclusive to those with discipline, skill, or effort. However, for Aristotle ethics, these qualities are essential for eudaimonia as they shape the soul to desire what is genuinely good. As a result of this, frequent social media users are typically shaped by improper desires for stimulation. Shannon Vallor, a modern philosopher known for her work on the philosophy of technology, argues that social media platforms disrupt moral development by fragmenting users' attention and encouraging superficial interactions (Vallor 2016). She further explains that the environment social media creates is not conducive of the development of virtues such as discipline or patience (Vallor 2016). Vallor instead emphasizes the importance of deliberate cultivation of these virtues to navigate the challenges posed by modern technology (Vallor 2016). Aristotle would certainly argue that these pleasures are improper as they train individuals to seek pleasures incompatible with virtuous life. Without habituation towards meaningful activity, Aristotle would explain that one's soul would become divided as its desires are not aligned with reason.

Another norm of modern society that Aristotle would criticize is emotional fragility. Society facilitates the belief that feelings of adversity or discomfort are to be avoided at all costs, while Aristotle believes that enduring certain forms of pain are essential to one's development. In particular, he argues that we must be trained to tolerate pain, especially when it is from doing something good or restraining our desires. One who frequently flees this discomfort would develop a character incompatible with virtue, as resilience to this pain comes from habituation. Understanding the value of doing good, regardless of its difficulty, is imperative for one to ultimately derive pleasure in virtuous action.

Another fascinating topic in this regard are the physical activity levels which occur in modern societies. Over the last several decades, there has been a significant decline in global physical activity levels, as we have opted for a more comfortable, sedentary lifestyle (Strain et al. 2024). However, someone who is physically fit understands that consistent training reshapes their desires to find pleasure in what is difficult. Over time, it is likely that one will even find satisfaction from this action which they previously found uncomfortable. Physical training reflects the essence of Aristotle's moral development; learning to desire what is good and aligning this desire with reason. As with moral virtue, habituation of exercise requires consistency and the eventual transformation of one's pleasures and pains.

Outlined by these contemporary examples, Aristotle's framework emphasizes that pleasure should not be rejected, but rather enjoyed as a byproduct of action aligned with reason. In a world increasingly shaped by instant gratification, training oneself to feel pleasure in doing what is good, despite its difficulty, is more relevant than ever.

Limitations of Aristotle's Ethics

Although Aristotle's depiction of pleasure is a profound view on moral development, it rests entirely on assumptions which are not always true. His theory presumes that individuals capable of becoming virtuous are raised in ideal communities with good laws, proper education, and moral role models. However, many people are born into environments shaped by instability and injustice, where survival is prioritized over moral cultivation. In these conditions, character may be formed by necessity rather than by virtue. Aristotle's lack of guidance for people born in these situations overlooks how structural disadvantages can hinder moral development.

Additionally, Aristotle's framework assumes that misaligned pleasures reflect a failure of moral training, however modern psychology explains that emotional responses are far more complicated (Harvard Health Publishing 2021). For instance, individuals who greatly suffer from anxiety or depression may not feel pleasure from doing what is good. This is not because they are unvirtuous, but because their emotional systems face a psychological barrier restraining them from Aristotle's account of pleasure. If pleasure and pain are not always within one's control, then moral failure should not always be attributed to weakness of will or viciousness. Aristotle's ethics ultimately fail to account for the impacts psychological suffering may have on one's relationship with the good.

A further limitation that Aristotle does not account for is the progression of technology and its impacts on modern desires. Technology is chronically invented to optimize particular aspects of daily life, and thus, make it less straining for humans. As these contemporary technologies increasingly shape our habits, Aristotle's definition of ethical life becomes more difficult to sustain. Aristotle does not foresee the invention of technologies like artificial intelligence which are poised to drastically change human life in the near future. This poses an important character: must one reject these technologies to preserve moral character? While total rejection may align with Aristotle's view, it risks leaving one disconnected from the society advancing around them. This ambiguity reflects a modern limitation of his framework – the absence of a strategy for ethically incorporating technology into a life of eudaimonia.

Although there are some limitations to Aristotle's ethics in contemporary times, it does not undermine the overall message of his teachings. His belief that pleasure must be guided by habituation to ultimately align with desire is powerfully relevant. A contemporary Aristotelian could acknowledge these limitations and expand its framework to reflect modern issues, thereby adapting his teachings so they remain relevant for today.

Conclusion

Overall, Aristotle's account of pleasure and pain remains a compelling framework for understanding moral development. Across Books II, VII, and X of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, he demonstrates the importance that the feelings of pleasure and pain have on one's journey towards virtuousness. While this framework assumes conditions challenged by modernity, Aristotle's emphasis on aligning reason with desire through habitation remains extremely valuable. By critically examining its limitations and adapting it to modern challenges, Aristotelian ethics will remain a powerful guide to eudaimonia in the contemporary world.